Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Error to award Durational alimony without requisite findings

In HAMMAD v. HAMMAD, 39 FLW D1964a (Fla. 5th DCA) in case No. 5D14-577 in an opinion filed September 12, 2014, the Husband appealed the award of durational alimony to the Wife and the award of 75% of her attorney fees arguing an abuse of discretion. As the final judgement lacked the requisite findings under section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2013). Interestingly, the Wife conceded error in the alimony award and the award of attorney fees acknowledging that the final judgments lacked the findings of fact required. The DCA agreed, reversed and remanded. Citation added
Sec. 61.08 (2) In deterrmining whether to award alimony or maintenance, the court shall first make a specific factual determination as to whether either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance. If the court finds that a party has a need for alimony or maintenance and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance, then in determining the proper type and amount of alimony or maintenance under subsections (5)-(8), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party, including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
(g) The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children they have in common.
(h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.
(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments of any asset held by that party.
(j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
(3) To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.
(4) For purposes of determining alimony, there is a rebuttable presumption that a short-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of less than 7 years, a moderate-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of greater than 7 years but less than 17 years, and long-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of 17 years or greater. The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.
(5) Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.
(6)(a) Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for self-support through either:
1. The redevelopment of previous skills or credentials; or
2. The acquisition of education, training, or work experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or credentials.
(b) In order to award rehabilitative alimony, there must be a specific and defined rehabilitative plan which shall be included as a part of any order awarding rehabilitative alimony.
(c) An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated in accordance with s.61.14 based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.
(7) Durational alimony may be awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration or following a marriage of long duration if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis. An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. The amount of an award of durational alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances in accordance with s. 61.14. However, the length of an award of durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not exceed the length of the marriage.
Full opinion follows:
(PER CURIAM.) Ihab Hammad (Former Husband) appeals a final judgment that dissolved his marriage to Thamina Hammad (Former Wife). On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Former Wife durational alimony and ordering Former Husband to pay seventy-five percent of Former Wife's attorney's fees without making the requisite findings of fact. Regarding the alimony award, Former Wife concedes error because the final judgment lacks the factual findings required under section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2013). See Roth v. Cortina, 59 So. 3d 163, 165-66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Likewise, Former Wife concedes error as to the award of attorney's fees, again acknowledging that the final judgment is devoid of factual findings regarding Former Wife's financial need and Former Husband's ability to pay. See Allen v. Allen, 114 So. 3d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
REVERSED and REMANDED. (EVANDER, COHEN and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.)

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