Tuesday, November 11, 2014

Second DCA certifies question of whether same-sex couple can divorce in Florida

In Shaw v. Shaw, 39 FLW S561a (Fla 2d DCA) in case No. SC14-1664 in an opinion filed on September 5, 2014 , the Second DCA certified to the Florida Supreme Court the issue of whether a same-sex couple lawfully married in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage can be denied the right to divorce in Florida.
The Second District Court of Appeal has certified, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(5), of the Florida Constitution, that the trial court has passed upon a question of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by this Court. Having reviewed the Second District's certification, as well as the dissenting opinion of Judge Altenbernd, we decline at this time to accept jurisdiction of the appeal under article V, section 3(b)(5), for the reasons set forth in Judge Altenbernd's dissent. See Shaw v. Shaw, No. 2D14-2384, 2014 WL 4212771, *3 (Fla. 2d DCA Aug. 27, 2014) [39 Fla. L. Weekly D1813a] (Altenbernd, J., dissenting).
The case is hereby remanded to the Second District for further proceedings. No motion for rehearing will be entertained by the Court. (LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, and PERRY, JJ., concur. CANADY, J., concurs in result.)

Court erred by its abdication to the desires of the children in determining time-sharing

In ORIZONDO v. ORIZONDO, 39 FLW D1906a (Fla. 5th DCA) in case no. 5D13-4251 in an opinion filed on September 5, 2014, error to apportion uncovered medical expenses enequally where parties incomes were substantially equal, error to order an amount of child support arrearage that exceeded husband's ability to pay per his filed financial affidavit, and error to fashion a time-sharing schedule based on the desires of the children where one child has turned 18 and the other was months away. (Clearly the Trial court Judge had raised teenagers and the FCA judges have not!) I don't understand the reasoning on this issue.
Full opinion follows:
(PER CURIAM.) Christopher Orizondo (Former Husband) appeals the final judgment dissolving his marriage to Cheryl Orizondo (Former Wife). The parties had two daughters born of the marriage: one is already eighteen, and the other will be turning eighteen in less than six months. The parties agreed to allow the trial judge to meet with the daughters and consider their desires with regard to time-sharing. No ruling on time-sharing was going to repair the strained relationship between Former Husband and his daughters. However, the trial court's admitted abdication to the desires of the children constitutes reversible error. See Perez v. Perez, 767 So. 2d 513, 518-19 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So. 2d 1251, 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
We also find that other portions of the final judgment must be reversed. The trial court set child support at $791 per month, pursuant to the child support guidelines, and determined the arrearage to be $8,756. Neither party disputed these amounts. When the trial court asked for a suggested amount for payment of the arrearage, Former Wife recommended $500 per month and Former Husband suggested ten percent. Apparently, the trial court interpreted Former Husband's suggestion to mean ten percent of the total arrearage: $875.60 per month. However, Former Husband, via his counsel, intended to suggest ten percent of the monthly obligation. Under the trial court's interpretation, the amount required to be paid for the arrearage was greater than the monthly child support obligation. A review of Former Husband's financial affidavit reflects an inability to meet both his own expenses and the combined child support award. We remand for the trial court to reconsider the arrearage payments. The court may take into consideration the age of the children in establishing the monthly arrearage payment.1
Additionally, as conceded by Former Wife, the unequal allocation of uncovered reasonable and necessary medical expenses constituted error. The parties' incomes were substantially equal. On remand, Former Husband shall be responsible for fifty percent of such expenses.
Lastly, the parties listed their various liabilities and noted that none were being paid. On remand, despite the nonpayment, the final judgment should allocate the liabilities and include factual findings to support the allocation. See § 61.075, Fla. Stat. (2013).
The remaining issues raised on appeal were either not preserved or lack merit.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. (EVANDER, COHEN, JJ., and HARRIS, C. M., Senior Judge, concur.)
__________________
1This will necessitate the entry of a new income deduction order, mooting other issues raised on appeal.

Award of permanent alimony in 12 year marriage reversed on category and amount

In VALENTE v. BARION, 39 FLW D1973a (Fla. 2d DCA) in an opinion filed September 12, 2014 The DCA reversed an award of permanent alimony in a 12-year marriage as the Order did not make the correct finding required by subsection 61.08(8), Florida Statutes (2011), to support the use of permanent alimony: (Statutory cite below) The court also found that the amout of permanent alimony awarded was based upon the Wife's financial affidavit, which included expenses for a house that had been sold . Reversed to revisit category of alimony- as it appeared durational may have been appropriate- and as to amount considering Wife's current expenses. Court also granted leave to revisit equitable distribution, if necessary.
(8) Permanent alimony may be awarded to provide for the needs and necessities of life as they were established during the marriage of the parties for a party who lacks the financial ability to meet his or her needs and necessities of life following a dissolution of marriage. Permanent alimony may be awarded following a marriage of long duration if such an award is appropriate upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), following a marriage of moderate duration if such an award is appropriate based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors set forth in subsection (2), or following a marriage of short duration if there are written findings of exceptional circumstances. In awarding permanent alimony, the court shall include a finding that no other form of alimony is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the parties. An award of permanent alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances or upon the existence of a supportive relationship in accordance with s.61.14.
Full opinion follows:
(ALTENBERND, Judge.) Joseph C. Valente appeals the final judgment of dissolution of his marriage to Theresa Barion. She cross appeals the judgment. We affirm the dissolution but reverse the final judgment's award of alimony to Ms. Barion and remand with special instructions.
The trial court awarded Ms. Barion permanent alimony in dissolving this twelve-year marriage. This decision was based, in large part, upon the health and employment status of the parties. In making this award of support, the trial court did not make the correct finding required by subsection 61.08(8), Florida Statutes (2011), to support the use of permanent alimony. The record at least suggests that durational alimony may be appropriate under the facts of this case. The evidence at trial strongly suggested that Ms. Barion's health and employment status were likely to improve in the two years following the entry of the judgment. Due to extensions granted during this appeal, it has now been more than two years since the entry of the judgment.
The amount of the alimony award was $5000 per month. This award of permanent alimony appears to have been based on the wife's financial affidavit that included substantial expenses for the marital home, which was required to be sold under the terms of the judgment. At oral argument the parties confirmed that the house already had been sold.
On remand, the court must determine whether durational or permanent alimony is appropriate and then determine the amount of that support. The court may update the evidence to determine both the type of alimony and the amount of alimony to be awarded.
The trial court also denied Ms. Barion's request for attorney's fees and retroactive alimony, in part, because of the award of permanent alimony. Accordingly, the trial court is authorized to revisit these issues on remand as necessary. Finally, although we are optimistic that the trial court can fashion an appropriate judgment without altering the equitable distribution in the judgment on appeal, on remand the court is authorized to revisit these other economic aspects of the final judgment if that is essential to a proper resolution of the issues.
I. THE FACTS
This couple married in 1999. Mr. Valente was a lieutenant in the New York City Police Department, and Ms. Barion worked for a financial services company in New York City. Following the collapse of the twin towers on September 11, 2001, the parties' marriage began to deteriorate. Mr. Valente was on sick leave when the towers collapsed, but he was nevertheless deployed to Ground Zero. He worked extensive hours at the site over the next six months. The experience resulted in physical health issues and major depression. By 2007, he was classified as retired on full disability pension. Fortunately, his disability pension and other disability benefits have provided Mr. Valente with an annual income in excess of $125,000.
Ms. Barion received no physical injuries on September 11, but the emotional and economic aftermath of those events left her struggling as well. She lost her well-paying job. She concluded that the couple should move from their Staten Island home and make a new start in Manatee County, where she had relatives. In 2007, the couple, both in their late thirties and without children, sold their home and moved to Florida, where they purchased a new marital home.
Mr. Valente had no friends in Florida and missed New York. Perhaps due to his depression, he made many poor financial choices. Ultimately, in May 2011, Ms. Barion filed for dissolution of marriage. Mr. Valente returned to New York.
Without detailing the evidence, in the period after 2001, Ms. Barion suffered from psychological and physical issues that limited her employability and increased her expenses. The evidence did not support a finding that these conditions were permanent. Although predicting the durations of these conditions was difficult at trial, the testimony suggested that she should experience substantial improvement over the following two years.
The judgment on appeal grants a dissolution and equitably distributes the marital assets and liabilities. The assets and liabilities are relatively limited; the marital home and the wife's retirement plans from earlier employment make up the majority of the assets. The debts are primarily the mortgage on the home, car loans, and credit card debt. The judgment then makes an award of alimony, declines to award retroactive alimony over and above the payments of temporary alimony, and denies attorney's fees and costs. We conclude that the trial court erred in determining alimony. Unfortunately, due to the modest circumstances of the marriage and the health of the parties, this error may require reconsideration of the other portions of the final judgment.
II. IN A MODERATE-TERM MARRIAGE, THE DECISION
TO GRANT PERMANENT ALIMONY REQUIRES
A FINDING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE THAT PERMANENT ALIMONY
IS APPROPRIATE
This case is governed by the version of section 61.08 that went into effect on July 1, 2011. See ch. 2011-92, § 79, at 1703-04, Laws of Fla. Thus, the trial court had authority to award durational alimony. See § 61.08(7). The parties' twelve-year marriage is regarded as a moderate-term marriage.See § 61.08(4). In such a case, permanent alimony may be awarded, but the trial court must decide that it is appropriate “based upon clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors set forth in subsection [61.08](2).” § 61.08(8); see also Walker v. Walker, 85 So. 3d 553, 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“In order to award permanent alimony, the trial court must make specific factual determinations with regard to actual need on the part of the former spouse seeking an alimony award.”).
In this case, the trial court awarded permanent periodic alimony in the amount of $5000 per month. But the trial court supported its award with findings that appear to better support an award of durational alimony without explaining why permanent periodic alimony would be more appropriate. Specifically, the court determined that the wife is currently capable of working only part time, but it also opined that if she continued with counseling and medications as she was directed, she could be capable of full time employment in two years. The court did not explain why the alimony award should be permanent despite its finding that the need may be temporary. Because it is unclear from the record whether her condition is permanent and thus whether the trial court appropriately awarded permanent periodic alimony over durational alimony, we remand for the trial court to address the issue with specific findings. The court may take additional evidence as necessary.
We emphasize that we are not holding that the trial court cannot award permanent alimony in this case. But in light of the parties' respective circumstances, it is important for the trial court to demonstrate that any choice for permanent alimony be based on clear and convincing evidence supporting that decision and not merely the decision to award the amount of $5000.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. (KHOUZAM and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.)

Error to award Durational alimony without requisite findings

In HAMMAD v. HAMMAD, 39 FLW D1964a (Fla. 5th DCA) in case No. 5D14-577 in an opinion filed September 12, 2014, the Husband appealed the award of durational alimony to the Wife and the award of 75% of her attorney fees arguing an abuse of discretion. As the final judgement lacked the requisite findings under section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2013). Interestingly, the Wife conceded error in the alimony award and the award of attorney fees acknowledging that the final judgments lacked the findings of fact required. The DCA agreed, reversed and remanded. Citation added
Sec. 61.08 (2) In deterrmining whether to award alimony or maintenance, the court shall first make a specific factual determination as to whether either party has an actual need for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance. If the court finds that a party has a need for alimony or maintenance and that the other party has the ability to pay alimony or maintenance, then in determining the proper type and amount of alimony or maintenance under subsections (5)-(8), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:
(a) The standard of living established during the marriage.
(b) The duration of the marriage.
(c) The age and the physical and emotional condition of each party.
(d) The financial resources of each party, including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each.
(e) The earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability of the parties and, when applicable, the time necessary for either party to acquire sufficient education or training to enable such party to find appropriate employment.
(f) The contribution of each party to the marriage, including, but not limited to, services rendered in homemaking, child care, education, and career building of the other party.
(g) The responsibilities each party will have with regard to any minor children they have in common.
(h) The tax treatment and consequences to both parties of any alimony award, including the designation of all or a portion of the payment as a nontaxable, nondeductible payment.
(i) All sources of income available to either party, including income available to either party through investments of any asset held by that party.
(j) Any other factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.
(3) To the extent necessary to protect an award of alimony, the court may order any party who is ordered to pay alimony to purchase or maintain a life insurance policy or a bond, or to otherwise secure such alimony award with any other assets which may be suitable for that purpose.
(4) For purposes of determining alimony, there is a rebuttable presumption that a short-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of less than 7 years, a moderate-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of greater than 7 years but less than 17 years, and long-term marriage is a marriage having a duration of 17 years or greater. The length of a marriage is the period of time from the date of marriage until the date of filing of an action for dissolution of marriage.
(5) Bridge-the-gap alimony may be awarded to assist a party by providing support to allow the party to make a transition from being married to being single. Bridge-the-gap alimony is designed to assist a party with legitimate identifiable short-term needs, and the length of an award may not exceed 2 years. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. An award of bridge-the-gap alimony shall not be modifiable in amount or duration.
(6)(a) Rehabilitative alimony may be awarded to assist a party in establishing the capacity for self-support through either:
1. The redevelopment of previous skills or credentials; or
2. The acquisition of education, training, or work experience necessary to develop appropriate employment skills or credentials.
(b) In order to award rehabilitative alimony, there must be a specific and defined rehabilitative plan which shall be included as a part of any order awarding rehabilitative alimony.
(c) An award of rehabilitative alimony may be modified or terminated in accordance with s.61.14 based upon a substantial change in circumstances, upon noncompliance with the rehabilitative plan, or upon completion of the rehabilitative plan.
(7) Durational alimony may be awarded when permanent periodic alimony is inappropriate. The purpose of durational alimony is to provide a party with economic assistance for a set period of time following a marriage of short or moderate duration or following a marriage of long duration if there is no ongoing need for support on a permanent basis. An award of durational alimony terminates upon the death of either party or upon the remarriage of the party receiving alimony. The amount of an award of durational alimony may be modified or terminated based upon a substantial change in circumstances in accordance with s. 61.14. However, the length of an award of durational alimony may not be modified except under exceptional circumstances and may not exceed the length of the marriage.
Full opinion follows:
(PER CURIAM.) Ihab Hammad (Former Husband) appeals a final judgment that dissolved his marriage to Thamina Hammad (Former Wife). On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Former Wife durational alimony and ordering Former Husband to pay seventy-five percent of Former Wife's attorney's fees without making the requisite findings of fact. Regarding the alimony award, Former Wife concedes error because the final judgment lacks the factual findings required under section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2013). See Roth v. Cortina, 59 So. 3d 163, 165-66 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). Likewise, Former Wife concedes error as to the award of attorney's fees, again acknowledging that the final judgment is devoid of factual findings regarding Former Wife's financial need and Former Husband's ability to pay. See Allen v. Allen, 114 So. 3d 1102, 1104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).
REVERSED and REMANDED. (EVANDER, COHEN and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.)

Wife's rental income from properties incorrectly included in equitable distribution scheme

In MAI NGUYEN v. HUONG KIM HUYNH, 39 FLW D1982a (Fla. 1st DCA) in case No. 1D13-4146 in an opinion filed September 16, 2014, the DCA, finding merit in only one of the Wife's seven arguments on appeal,reversed the inclusion of rental income allocated to the Wife as there was no supporting evidence in the record explaining the substantial amounts allocated. Reversed and remanded for the trial court to make additional findings of fact explaining the amount allocated as rental income.
Full opinion follows:
(PER CURIAM.) Mai Nguyen, the former wife, appeals a supplemental final judgment of dissolution of marriage and asserts seven errors. We find merit only in her argument that the trial court erred in devising its equitable distribution scheme relating to rental income from marital properties. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the equitable distribution in the supplemental final judgment and remand for further proceedings.
The parties owned a number of residences that produced rental income during the marriage. In the supplemental final judgment, the trial court found that (1) from the October 24, 2003, filing date of the petition to dissolve the marriage until the parties' separation on July 1, 2009, the former wife received $257,652.00 in net rental income from the parties' marital assets; and (2) since the separation, the former wife had received $244,627.00 in total net rental income from the parties' marital assets. As to both amounts, the court determined that the former wife had fraudulently conveyed, transferred, and/or hidden this income that she solely received. In the equitable distribution, the court distributed the sum of these amounts ($502,279.00) to the former wife as proceeds from real property received by her.
The former wife asserts that the trial court erred in offsetting rental income received by her during the marriage against her portion of the equitable distribution of marital assets. In a contested dissolution action like this one, where the parties have not entered and filed a stipulation and agreement, “any distribution of marital assets or marital liabilities shall be supported by factual findings in the judgment or order based on competent substantial evidence . . . .” § 61.075(3), Fla. Stat. (2009). These findings must be sufficient “to advise the parties or the reviewing court of the trial court's rationale for the distribution . . . .” § 61.075(3)(d); Jordan v. Jordan, 127 So. 3d 794, 796 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).
In allocating $502,279.00 in rental income assets to the former wife, the trial court did not cite any supporting evidence in the record or explain the basis for this substantial amount (or either of the two component amounts). The record does not otherwise disclose the source or reliability of this amount. These omissions render it impossible to conduct meaningful appellate review as to whether competent substantial evidence supports the determination that the former wife received and fraudulently conveyed, transferred, and/or hid $502,279.00 in proceeds from the rental properties.Furbee v. Barrow, 45 So. 3d 22, 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).
We therefore reverse the equitable distribution scheme in the supplemental final judgment and remand for the trial court to make additional findings of fact explaining the evidentiary source of the amount allocated to the former wife as rental income. Harrell v. Harrell, 947 So. 2d 638, 639 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). The trial court may revisit any other related financial issue to the extent that it is affected by any changes in the equitable distribution plan. Santiago v. Santiago, 51 So. 3d 637, 639 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. (THOMAS, RAY, and OSTERHAUS, JJ., CONCUR.)

Childcare costs not actually incurrred incorrectly included in child support arrearage calculation

In Knudson v. Drobnak, 39 FLW D1987a (Fla. 4th DCA) in case No. 4D13-3714 in an opinion filed on September 17, 2014, the DCA held that the trial court incorrectly calculated the father's arrearage by including childcare costs there were not actually incurred by the Mother. Reversed and remanded to recalculate the arrearage.
Full opinion follows:
(Ciklin, J.) Derek Knudson (“father”) appeals from an order modifying child support. He raises multiple issues on appeal, only one of which warrants reversal. The father asserts that the trial court's calculation of arrearages erroneously included childcare costs not actually incurred by Monique Drobnak (“mother”). Because the record confirms the father's contention, we reverse and remand for the trial court to recalculate the arrearages.
Some years after the parties' marriage was dissolved, the father petitioned for a modification of his child support obligation based on a reduction in his income. During the hearing on the father's petition, the mother testified that she was unemployed for a six-month period ending in December 2012. Additionally, an exhibit the mother submitted at trial reflected that because she was not working outside of the home, she incurred no child care costs between June 2012 and November 2012.
The court found a substantial change in circumstances and reduced the father's child support obligation retroactive to April 2012. The mother's childcare expenses were included in the court's calculation of the modified child support obligation. However, the order on appeal contains no indication that the father's arrearages were credited for the period of time the mother did not actually incur childcare expenses. It was error for the trial court to include in the arrearages childcare expenses that were not incurred by the mother. See § 61.30(7), Fla. Stat. (2011) (requiring, for certain purposes, “incurred” childcare costs to be added to the basic obligation in calculating child support); G.S.P. v. K.B., 30 So. 3d 667, 669-70 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (remanding to trial court to adjust child support obligation in modification order where evidence reflected that child support amount included childcare costs that were not incurred after a specified date); Anderko v. Nicholson, 997 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (finding error in award of childcare costs in the absence of evidence they were incurred).
Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to recalculate the arrearages, subtracting childcare expenses for the months the mother did not incur them. In all other respects, we affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. (Gross and May, JJ., concur.)

Court cannot Order what Wife did not plead for: Alimony and attorney fee award reversed

In Clark v. Clark , 39 FLW D2027a (Fla. 5th DCA) in case No. 5D13-1464 in an opinion filed September 19, 2014, the trial court adopted the Wife's proposed final Judgment verbatim without opportunity for comments or objections by Husband creating the appearance that the trial judge did not exercise any independent judgment, especially in the absence of any findings or conclusions in the record forming the basis for the awards. In a rather scathing opinion, the DCA, because the husband failed to attend the hearing, upheld the findings on all but the alimony and attorney fee awards, which were reversed because they had never been pled. This one is worth reading.
Full opinion follows:
(PER CURIAM.) Donald Clark (“Husband”) appeals a final judgment dissolving his sixteen-year marriage with Chrystal Clark (“Wife”), arguing that the trial court erred by (1) adopting Wife's proposed final judgment verbatim; (2) awarding Wife relief that she did not seek in her petition for dissolution of marriage; (3) awarding Wife sole parental responsibility of the parties' minor children without giving Husband the opportunity to testify; (4) ordering an equitable distribution of marital assets unsupported by substantial, competent evidence; (5) failing to make specific findings to support the awards of alimony and child support; and (6) awarding Wife attorney's fees without regard to the reasonableness of the fees or his ability to pay. We affirm the dissolution, the time sharing arrangement, and the entitlement to child support. We reverse and remand the amount of child support and equitable distribution for further consideration.
In her petition for dissolution of marriage, Wife requested: (1) an order dissolving the marriage; (2) a parenting plan with a time sharing schedule; (3) the distribution of assets and liabilities; and (4) child support. Wife's petition neither sought nor alleged entitlement to alimony or a need for attorney's fees. In his answer, Husband generally admitted Wife's allegations, except regarding the marital home's address, his ability to provide life insurance, and his alleged alcoholism. He specifically admitted reasonable child support was appropriate. The notice of hearing of the dissolution was sent to Husband's correct address, but he failed to appear, and the court conducted the hearing without him.
After testimony, the court awarded attorney's fees and made the following findings:
THE COURT: All right. Then having considered the testimony and again noting that it is now 9:15 and we still don't have an appearance from Mr. Clark, I will enter an order dissolving the marriage, find that it is irretrievably broken, adopt the parenting plan as proposed, giving Mrs. Clark sole parental responsibility with the time sharing with the father at her discretion and subject to his sobriety. Child support -- is there a guideline worksheet in the file, Mr. Kneller?
MR. KNELLER: After I have the alimony computation --
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KNELLER: I'll prepare one and tender it with the Final Judgment.
THE COURT: I will order permanent periodic alimony, as requested, child support according to the guidelines, equitable distribution as requested to be paid for as requested on a monthly basis. The property and debts to be distributed.
Wife proffered a five-page, single-spaced final judgment containing matters not mentioned by the court. Specifically, the court did not determine the value of the home and the mortgage, the amount of time spent on the case by the attorney, or the attorney's hourly rate. The proposed judgment also ruled on matters not requested by Wife in her complaint, notably, alimony and attorney's fees. The court signed this judgment. However, there was no child support guideline worksheet in the file for the court to consider at the time he referred the matter to the Wife's attorney.
In Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, the Florida Supreme Court stated:
We understand and appreciate the fact that a trial judge in these often complex and multi-issue dissolution cases can benefit from proposed findings and conclusions prepared by the parties. Such proposals can serve as a starting point and reminder of the facts and issues that should be considered and weighed by the judge in his or her own evaluation. However, such submissions cannot substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge. When the trial judge accepts verbatim a proposed final judgment submitted by one party without an opportunity for comments or objects by the other party, there is an appearance that the trial judge did not exercise his or her independent judgment in the case. This is especially true when the judge has made no findings or conclusions on the record that would form the basis for the party's proposed final judgment. This type of proceeding is fair to neither the parties involved in a particular case nor our judicial system.
875 So. 2d 383, 389-90 (Fla. 2004) On appeal, Husband claims that the court permitted wife's proposed final judgment submitted to substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues and law by the trial judge. We agree.
In a dissolution action, an issue is properly before the court when it is raised in the pleadings or when it is raised and considered by the court without objection. Sugrim v. Sugrim, 649 So. 2d 936, 938 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Wife contends that the issues of alimony and attorney's fees were listed in her pre-trial compliance putting Husband on notice. However, this document is not a substitute for amending the complaint. See Savage v. Savage, 955 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“[T]rial courts are not permitted to enter awards of attorney's fees when a request for same has not been properly pled.”). This case is similar to Kratzer v. Reimiller, 552 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). In Kratzer, after failing to respond to a petition for dissolution, a default was entered against the husband. 572 So. 2d at 1188. The wife's petition did not allege entitlement to alimony or the need for attorney's fees. Id. The husband then appeared at the final hearing, but due to the default, he was not permitted to participate. Id. This Court did not find consent to amend the complaint, nor did we find the pretrial compliance was a proper substitution for a pleading. Id. at 1189. Thus, we reversed the judgment awarding alimony and attorney's fees. Id.
When a pleading fails to make a specific demand, courts will accept the issue as being “tried by implied consent” where a pre-trial statement raises the issue and the other party fails to object at the hearing. See Hemraj v. Hemraj, 620 So. 2d 1300, 1301 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (finding implied consent to alimony where one party objected to some, but not all, of the statements in opposing party's pre-trial statement); DeLoach v. DeLoach, 552 So. 2d 324, 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (holding when an issue regarding equitable distribution is raised and considered without objection, it is appropriate to regard the issue as if it had been pled).
Wife suggests that Husband's failure to attend the hearing is tantamount to consenting to amending the complaint in any way but offers no authority for this proposition. Unpled issues tried when a party does not appear are not tried by consent, but in absentia.
By blindly approving Wife's proposed final judgment, which covered matters not pled and include matters not orally resolved by the trial court, this final judgment acted as a “substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge.” Perlow, 875 So. 2d at 389-90.
We affirm the dissolution, time sharing arrangement and the entitlement to child support. We reverse the alimony and attorney's fee awards. We reverse and remand for further consideration the amount of child support and equitable distribution.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. (TORPY, C.J., PALMER, J., and HARRIS, C. M., Senior Judge, concur.)